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The environmental remediation required to permanently decommission
most industrial projects is an expensive and irreversible investment. Real
options literature shows that temporarily closing a project and postponing
decommissioning has value when economic conditions are uncertain and fu-
ture reactivation is possible. However, high decommissioning costs create
an incentive to “temporarily” close a project, even when there is no inten-
tion to reactivate. This paper estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of
closure to evaluate the likelihood of reactivation. The model reveals that
the option to temporarily close is being widely used to avoid environmental
remediation of oil and gas wells in Canada.
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Once an industrial project, such as a landﬁll, nuclear power plant, mine, or oil
ﬁeld has reached the end of its life, the costs associated with permanently de-
commissioning operations tend to be very high. Literature on real options has
shown that inertia is optimal in dynamic decisions involving sunk costs in uncer-
tain environments [Dixit, 1989, 1992, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994]. There is value
to temporarily close a project, and postpone the investment needed to decom-
mission, when there is a chance that a project will be restarted in the future.
However, once temporarily closed, the project could remain in a state of hystere-
sis. Because there is a sunk cost to reactivate, even if the cause of the project’s
closure is reversed, the project may still not be reactivated. Decommissioning
an industrial project involves high sunk costs because of requirements to remedi-
ate existing environmental damages and implement measures to prevent ongoing
or future damages. By not decommissioning a project, the temporarily closed
state carries environmental risks that might not be internalized by the owner of
the project. Regulators have imperfect information and often allow temporary
closure so as not to cut the life of a viable project short. It could be the case,
however, that the option to reactivate does not exist, but an owner “temporarily”
closes a project as a way to avoid paying to decommission. Without knowing
the value of the option to reactivate, the motive behind a temporary closure is
obscured. This paper demonstrates that data on closure decisions can be used to
structurally estimate a real options model which can be used to test the likelihood
that “temporary” closure is permanent.
This paper examines the oil and gas industry, where permanent decommission-
ing of wells is required (plugging, abandonment, and reclaiming the surrounding
2land), however regulators, not wanting to impede production, make temporary
closure an option. Currently, there are hundreds of thousands of “temporarily
abandoned” oil and gas wells scattered across North America, including over
3,700 temporarily abandoned wells in the Gulf of Mexico, and at least 17,000
in Pennsylvania.1 Not permanently decommissioning an oil or gas well increases
the risk of contamination of the atmosphere, drinking water, vegetation, and soil;
lost productivity of other wells in the same pool; erosion; forest fragmentation;
and even explosions [Kubichek et al., 1997, Williams et al., 2000, Mitchell and
Casman, 2011]. Postponing permanent decommissioning also increases the risk
that a ﬁrm will declare bankruptcy before undertaking the expense of the en-
vironmental cleanup. Texas, for example, has roughly 10,000 orphaned inactive
wells [Railroad Commission of Texas, 2006]. Under the current drilling boom
for oil shale and shale gas, understanding ﬁrms’ incentives to environmentally
remediate wells once they are exhausted is of growing import.
I model the producer’s decision to activate, inactivate, or decommission a well
in a real options framework and recover the parameters of the model using data
on the decisions made for 84,000 oil and gas wells from 2000 to 2007. The model
includes price and quantity uncertainty. By estimating the structural parameters
of a real options model, I can test the goodness-of-ﬁt of a real options model
to actual ﬁrm behavior. Real options extends the Black and Scholes [1973] and
Merton [1973] theory for ﬁnancial options to that of irreversible real investments.
Real options models put value on investment ﬂexibility; having the option to
wait before investing will add value to the project. Much of the literature on
real options relies on examples from the natural resource industry, and models of
1According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement,
Borehole Dataset, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/well/freewell.html
and Mitchell and Casman [2011] respectively.
3many diﬀerent discrete decisions in the industry have been developed. The same
three choices presented in this paper (to activate, inactivate, or decommission
a project) have been modeled by Brennan and Schwartz [1985],2 and Dixit and
Pindyck [1994], Gamba and Tesser [2009]. However, none of these authors applied
their models to real data.
Unlike the case of ﬁnancial derivative models, empirical investigations testing
the ﬁt of real options models to data are rare. Gamba and Tesser [2009] note that
this is due to two factors: the values of the state variables are often not observed
and there is quantity uncertainty. In this paper, I am able to estimate quantity
uncertainty by exploiting a unique dataset of reserve estimates of 42,000 oil and
gas pools over time. Much of the empirical work has relied on having data for
the cost parameters rather than structurally estimating these parameters, thereby
restricting their investigations to small sample sizes.3
Generally data on production are more readily available than data on costs
(production reporting is usually mandatory, whereas cost data are proprietary)
and therefore the gains of not relying on cost data are immense. For this paper,
relative costs are estimated using data on production decisions via Rust [1987]’s
Nested Fixed Point Algorithm, which allows for a powerful way to take advantage
2There have also been many extensions to Brennan and Schwartz [1985]’s numerical example
of opening, closing and decommissioning a hypothetical copper mine (for example, Castillo-
Ramirez [1999], Cortazar and Casassus [1998], Cortazar et al. [2001], and Stensland and Tjos-
theim [1989]).
3Moel and Tufano [2002] compare stylized facts from real options theory to estimates from a
probit analysis of 285 gold mines, but without data on opening and closing costs; Paddock et al.
[1988] apply real options to value oﬀshore petroleum leases using data on 21 oﬀshore petroleum
tracts; Slade [2001] determines the value of mine opening and closings using panel data for
21 mines (where the opening, closing, and maintenance costs were “rough” estimates obtained
from interviewing people in the industry); Harchaoui and Lasserre [2001] use 60 observations
from copper mines to test if there are trigger prices as predicted by theory; Hurn and Wright
[1994] use data on 108 oil wells to estimate a hazard model to examine the time to develop
a ﬁeld to test predictions for irreversible investment decisions. An exception is Kellogg [2010]
who structurally estimates the eﬀect of price volatility on the decision to drill using data on
drilling rig rental costs.
4of the extensive production datasets available, without being dependent on cost
data.
Furthermore, throughout the real options literature the permanent closure op-
tion is often downplayed. Decommissioning costs are treated as negligible or null
[Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994], or the option of decom-
missioning is completely left out of the choice set [Moel and Tufano, 2002, Slade,
2001, Mason, 2001, Paddock et al., 1988]. By assuming away decommissioning
costs, the previous literature has overlooked the case of ﬁrms that continue to
maintain the option to reactivate a project, even when they have no intention,
or there is no option value to reactivate. If the costs from mothballing a project
are small relative to the decommissioning costs, this behavior could be privately
optimal. This is especially the case in the natural resources industry, where the
large imprint that is typically left on the environment makes decommissioning
costs high. Should there be externalities from mothballing a project (such as con-
tinued contamination of groundwater) that are not accounted for in the decision,
then this behavior may not be socially optimal. If a ﬁrm temporarily closes a
hazardous site, when in fact there is no potential or intention to reactivate, regu-
lators have reason to implement policies to ensure that environmental obligations
will be met. One of the main reasons for a policy to induce prompt environmen-
tal cleanup is the risk that the ﬁrm will declare bankruptcy. The concern that
oil and gas companies may walk away from their environmental obligations has
been brought up by Boyd [2001], Parente et al. [2006], and Ferreira et al. [2003].
While these authors discuss bonding mechanisms, the model here can be used to
quantify the eﬀect of a bond on production as well as the choice to undertake
cleanup.
Simulations using the estimated model predict that natural gas reserves are
5more responsive to changes in the price of gas than conventional oil reserves are
to the price of oil. Under high prices there is potential for large increases in
gas reserves; however, this is not the case for oil reserves when the oil price is
high. However, only with a drastic, arguably implausible, increase in prices and
recovery rates will there be a signiﬁcant increase in the number of reactivated
wells, implying that wells are typically left inactive not because of the option to
reactivate, but rather to avoid costly environmental obligations. Furthermore,
the contribution to the oil and gas supply from these reactivated wells is only
marginal. These ﬁndings have far reaching implications for the oil and gas indus-
try. If decommissioning costs are not being internalized, then development of oil
and gas reserves would be at a rate above what is socially optimal.
2 Oil and Gas Well Background
This paper focuses on Alberta, the main oil and gas producing province of
Canada. Extensive record keeping in Alberta has resulted in comprehensive data
on the industry. Also, unlike jurisdictions that limit the time that a well can be
left inactive, there is no limit to the length of time that a well can be left inactive
in Alberta.4 Because of the externalities associated with not decommissioning a
well, it is required that wells be decommissioned, but it is up to the producer
to decide the time frame. The economic lifespan of a well is uncertain and by
allowing temporary closure, the option to reactivate remains should prices or
technology improve. Some wells have not produced any oil or gas in the last 60
years; nevertheless, this closure is still classiﬁed as temporary because the wells
4In the U.S., even when there is a time limit, permission for extended “temporary abandon-
ment” is easily granted and the ﬁne for leaving a well inactive without permission is usually
small; for example, in Kansas the ﬁne is only $100 [State Corporation Commission of Kansas].
6have not been permanently decommissioned. The cleanup costs associated with
decommissioning in Alberta range from $20,000 to several million dollars per well
[Orphan], whereas the cost that a producer must pay to keep a well inactive is
usually only the payment to the owner of the surface rights (typically around
$1,500 per year [Marriott, 2001]). Figure 1 depicts the location of active, inac-
tive, and decommissioned wells in Alberta in 2007. As there are over 225,000
conventional oil and gas wells in Alberta alone that will eventually need to be








Figure 1: Oil and Gas wells in Alberta in 2007
An operator might incur losses to maintain an inactive well, when it is not
currently proﬁtable to produce oil or gas, in the hopes that prices or technology
improve. According to the data on reserves used in this paper, the percent of
hydrocarbon in place that is recoverable, the recovery rate, ranges from .01% to
90% for oil and from 15% to 95% for gas. However, once a well is inactive, because
7of the sunk cost to reactivate or decommission, even if recovery rates improve
or diminish, the well may remain inactive. This hysteresis is directly modeled
in this paper, but there are other reasons for inactivity that are not explicitly
modeled, but enter via an error term that compensates for unobservable states:
(1) technical diﬃculties (for example, blockage in the wellbore, a leak caused by
corrosion or erosion, an external ﬁre, or a temperature change causing mechanical
failure), (2) pipeline failure or pipeline capacity reached, (3) gas plant capacity
reached, or (4) a mandated suspension for exceeding the maximum rate limit
assigned to the well by the regulator.5
The development of enhanced recovery methods has brought wells back into
production after many years of inactivity and recoverable reserves have been seen
to increase rather than decrease with time. Reserve growth was ﬁrst examined
by Arrington [1960] using his own company’s reservoir data. And since then
reserve growth has been studied using state or state subdivision estimates of
initial established reserves from the American Petroleum Institute [Morehouse,
1997] or a small number of pools [Verma and Henry, 2004]. This is the ﬁrst time
that such a large dataset on reserves has been used to study reserve growth.
2.1 Environmental Impacts
The fact that recoverable reserves can increase over time increases the value
of waiting to decommission a well. However, without proper decommissioning
(and in some cases, even after proper decommissioning) a well poses a risk to
vegetation, soil, surface water, and underground aquifers. Many wellbores extend
5Various wells must conform to maximum rate limitations set by the industry regulator.
These limits are to ensure that the cumulative amount of oil or gas extracted is maximized. In
this model I do not truncate by the maximum rate limit because only about 10% of the wells
have limits placed on them, and for only a portion of those wells is the rate limit binding.
8thousands of meters underground, and it is often only a steel casing or cement that
isolates the diﬀerent formations. The casing might rust out or crack (especially
when sand or salt water is lifted along with the hydrocarbons), and contaminants
such as uranium, lead, salt, iron, selenium, sulfates, and radon [Kubichek et al.,
1997] may enter into formations that contain fresh water. The likelihood of this
occurring increases when injection from disposal or enhanced recovery builds
pressure [Canter et al., 1987]. The most prevalent contaminant, methane, can
lead to explosions (there have been instances of homes and windmills exploding).
Decommissioning a well does not guarantee that there will be no leaks. Often
improperly decommissioned wells cause problems; nonetheless, the risk is much
reduced when compared to active or inactive wells.
2.1.1 Regulations for Decommissioning
In Alberta, it is required that all wells eventually be decommissioned; however,
it is left up to the ﬁrm to decide when to decommission.6 Decommissioning a
well entails abandonment and reclamation. To abandon a well is to leave it in a
permanently safe and stable condition so that it can be left indeﬁnitely without
damaging the environment. It is required that all non-saline water formations
are shutoﬀ with cement [ERCB, 2007b]. Reclamation includes removal of any
structures, decontamination of land or water, and reconstruction of the land
[Alberta Environment, 2000].
On the other hand, it can be very inexpensive for a producer to sustain an
idle well, and often the only cost is compensation to the owners of the surface
6The Energy Resources Conservation Board does have the authority to order that a wellsite
be decommissioned; however, this is not a common occurrence and the order is often rescinded
or amended. For example, in 2007 there were only 6 well abandonment orders and in 2006
there were 19 well abandonment orders, but as of June 2009 only 2 of these wells have been
abandoned [ERCB, 2009].
9rights. Compensation must be paid until the mineral rights owner has received a
reclamation certiﬁcate. Of 4,069 well leases, the average annual payment for loss
of land use was $184/acre and $1,146 for general disturbance [Marriott, 2001].
3 Data
The data collected on the oil and gas industry in Alberta are unrivaled in their
comprehensiveness and accessibility. Here, ﬁve datasets of the Albertan oil and
gas industry are used. The ﬁrst dataset is a panel of production from the uni-
verse of oil and gas wells in Alberta. Obtained through IHS Incorporated, which
distributes the records collected by the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation
Board (ERCB), this dataset contains monthly oil and gas production information
dating back to 1924, with complete records starting after 1961. There is informa-
tion on a well’s location (latitude and longitude as well as the name of the ﬁeld
and pool it is on7), depth, license date, spud date (when the drill hit the ground),
and on-production date, plus the names of the current and original operators
(unfortunately there is no information on whether a well switched hands between
these operators).
The second dataset is a panel of oﬃcial reserve estimates of all nonconﬁdential
pools in Alberta from both the ERCB and the National Energy Board of Canada.8
The dataset spans 2000 to 2007 and contains 67,142 oil and gas pools, although
not observed in every year. The year that the estimate was last reviewed is listed,
and therefore the data are extended to years prior to 2000 if the last review date
of the pool was before 2000. This dataset contains (1) initial oil or gas in place;
7An oil ﬁeld is the geographical area that a well is drilled. A ﬁeld can have multiple pools,
but each pool is a distinct reservoir that is conﬁned within impermeable rock or water.
8All pools eventually lose their conﬁdential status (usually after one year), and so this dataset
contains nearly all pools in Alberta.
10(2) recovery factor, which is the fraction of the oil or gas in place that can
be extracted “under current technology and present and anticipated economic
conditions” [ERCB, 2008]; (3) initial established reserves, which is equal to the
initial oil or gas in place multiplied by the recovery factor; and (4) remaining
established reserves, which is the initial established reserves minus the cumulative
production and surface loss. Each pool contains information on characteristics
of the pools and hydrocarbons in those pools, such as porosity, initial pressure,
area, density, temperature, and water saturation among others.
The third dataset is a list of all wells that were permanently decommissioned.
To decommission a well entails that the well has met abandonment standards set
by the ERCB [ERCB, 2007b] and reclamation standards set by Alberta Environ-
ment [Alberta Environment, 1995], and received a reclamation certiﬁcate from
Alberta Environment or Alberta Sustainable Resource Development or was ex-
empted from certiﬁcation. The dataset contains both wells that were abandoned,
along with the date of abandonment, and the wells that received a reclamation
certiﬁcate or were reclamation exempt.
The fourth dataset consists of GIS shape ﬁles that designate areas that, ac-
cording to the Petroleum Services Association of Canada (PSAC), have similar
costs in production and drilling (the areas are further described in the Appendix
Figure 5 and Table 6). The PSAC boundaries and well locations were entered
into ArcView GIS to assign a PSAC area to each well.
The ﬁnal dataset is the average wellhead price of crude oil and natural gas
in Alberta, obtained from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers’
Statistical Handbook [CAPP, 2009]. The wellhead price is inﬂated to 2007 dollars
using Statistics Canada’s quarterly machinery and equipment price index for
mining, quarries, and oil wells.
11A panel is created where each well is classiﬁed as active, inactive, or decom-
missioned for each year from when it was drilled until 2007. A well is classiﬁed
as active if it produced any volume of oil or gas within that year; classiﬁed as
inactive if it did not produce oil or gas in 12 months or more; and classiﬁed as
decommissioned if it appeared in the dataset of decommissioned wells.
The full dataset of the universe of wells in Alberta is pared down to a sub-
sample that is used for the estimation. Excluding coalbed methane, heavy oil,
injection, and water wells, there are 350,457 wells in the production dataset. The
decision to decommission, stop production, or reactivate a well depends on the
remaining oil and gas reserves, and so the full sample is restricted to only those
wells that have a reserve estimate. Of the 350,457 wells, 105,207 are in a pool
that is listed in the reserves dataset. The result of this restriction is that the
analysis corresponds to wells that are, or once were, deemed producible, i.e. not
“dry holes.” Wells that are drilled but do not tap into an oil or gas pool are more
likely to be decommissioned without being completed, and they will also not show
up in the subsample. More than 45% of the wells that are decommissioned in
Alberta are decommissioned immediately after being drilled. The results from
an estimation using the subsample, cannot be generalized to all wells in the full
sample, but could be generalized to wells in the full sample that at one time
produced.9 Whether to complete a well for production is a separate decision
from whether to produce from an already completed well. And indeed, it is more
challenging to determine the future of wells that have or once had a potential for
production as opposed to those that deﬁnitely cannot produce.
The subsample is further reduced by deleting wells that traverse both oil
and gas pools. Doing so does not signiﬁcantly reduce the size of the subsample
9The similarity between age at decommissioning for wells in full sample that produced and
all wells in the subsample are shown in Appendix Figure 8.
12(from 105,207 to 94,009); however, it does signiﬁcantly reduce the computational
complexity because modeling the choice to produce oil or gas is avoided without
losing much insight into the choice of operating state.
The majority of the wells have small reserves and only a few have large re-
serves, some being extremely large–for example, the largest gas reserve is 1,500
times larger than the mean gas reserve (Table 1). The pools with large reserves
have more than one well–as many as 4,151 wells in a gas pool and 711 in an oil
pool.
13Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Unit
Qgas 118187 15.23 62.95 0 8800 E6m3
Qoil 54523 27.09 237.07 0 43871 E3Barrels
Wellhead Pricegas 37 111.90 64.76 25.89 293.91 2007C$ =E3m3
Wellhead Priceoil 37 30.16 12.12 12.88 64.45 2007C$ =Barrel
Agegas 61876 19.86 15.76 1 104 Years
Ageoil 31430 16.58 12.15 1 94 Years
Qgas 118187 32.97 297.79 0 51271 E6m3
Qoil 54523 135.64 1026.83 0 104866 E3Barrels
No. of Wells in Poolgas 118187 3.59 47.02 1 4117 Wells
No. of Wells in Pooloil 54523 4.44 17.91 1 699 Wells
qgas 322907 1.68 8.27 0.0001 568.39 E6m3
qoil 155773 7.27 14.51 .001 822.95 E3Barrels
Depth 93239 1197.53 690.36 90.9 6552 m
Porositygas 22452 .20 .08 0.01 0.4 Fraction
Porosityoil 25894 .16 .07 0.01 0.36 Fraction
Densitygas 22452 .64 .08 0.54 2.03 kg=m3
Densityoil 25894 868.64 48.01 708 999 kg=m3
Initial Pressuregas 22452 9038.08 7564.57 130 99625 kPa
Initial Pressureoil 25894 12568.80 5688.37 1442 61097 kPa
Temperatureoil 25894 50.14 20.34 9 350 C 
Water Saturationoil 25894 .31 .12 0.06 0.82 Fraction
Wells per Firm 1196 281.93 2015.26 1 44095 Wells
Pool Discovery Yeargas 22452 1989.67 13.90 1904 2007 Year
Pool Discovery Yearoil 25894 1988.31 12.40 1910 2006 Year
Duration Inactiveoil 9556 8.39 8.33 0 73 Years
Duration Inactivegas 12298 9.58 10.23 0 78 Years
Duration Activeoil 14472 10.11 9.11 0 46 Years
Duration Activegas 34047 11.35 11.85 0 46 Years
Notes: Statistics for wells in the subsample. Data on remaining reserves (Q) are listed for
pools, 1993 - 2007. Extraction (q) is listed for wells, 1993 - 2007. The pool-speciﬁc variables–
depth, porosity, density, initial pressure, temperature, water saturation, and discovery year
are time invariant in the data. Data on the age of the wells, and duration active and inactive
are a snapshot of 2007. Price data are the wellhead price from 1971 to 2007. E3 = 1000.
The production dataset contains ﬁrm-reported volumes to which the accuracy
is diﬃcult to attest. The ERCB identiﬁes cases when there is any diﬀerence in the
reported production of oil from a production company and a pipeline company.
When the diﬀerence is 5% to 20% of reported gas volumes, the penalty is only
a warning message. Misreporting more results in a fee of $100 if a well does not
report in a given month, and upon persistent noncompliance the ﬁrm might be
subject to increased audits or inspections, or partial or full suspension [ERCB,
2007a]. Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge there is no other dataset of this
size or comprehensiveness of any natural resource industry. And with these data
14Table 2: Distribution of operating choice for inactive wells by age
Number of Proportion Proportion Proportion
Age (in years) Observations Reactivated Stay Inactive Decommissioned
(Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas)
1  age < 10 18963 21091 0.110 0.194 0.874 0.790 0.016 0.015
10  age < 20 19892 14965 0.056 0.066 0.922 0.915 0.022 0.019
20  age < 30 7997 11234 0.057 0.075 0.914 0.897 0.029 0.028
30  age < 40 2340 4791 0.046 0.054 0.928 0.913 0.026 0.033
40  age < 50 2176 3135 0.030 0.042 0.945 0.929 0.025 0.030
50  age < 60 704 1461 0.024 0.027 0.953 0.955 0.023 0.018
60  age < 70 131 503 0 0.010 1 0.990 0 0
age  70 50 157 0 0 1 0.987 0 0.013
Notes: Data from 2000-2007 subsample.
the composition of active, inactive, and decommissioned wells can be replicated
to match reality closely.
Table 2 shows the proportion of inactive oil and gas wells that have been
reactivated, left inactive, or decommissioned by diﬀerent age intervals. The table
illustrates that the hysteresis of inactivity increases as wells age. The proportion
of inactive wells that are reactivated decreases with the age of the well and the
proportion of inactive wells that are decommissioned is low for young wells and
for old wells.
4 Model
In order to capture the value of leaving a well inactive, I construct a real options
model that includes the following features: the operating state is dynamic and
can be changed now, or at some later date; there are unrecoverable sunk costs
to changing operating states; and future prices and recovery are uncertain. The
producer’s decision to extract, 1; temporarily stop extraction, 2; or permanently
decommission and remediate environmental damages, 3, is modeled as an inﬁnite
time Markov Decision Process [Rust, 1994]. It is assumed that the producer is
15rational and follows a decision rule dt = t(st;t)1
t=0 that maximizes the expected
discounted sum of proﬁts, V (s;) = max E [
P1
t=0 t(st;dt;tjs0 = s;0 = )],
where V is the value function for the well when choosing the optimal choice, ,
and depends on observed state variables s, and an unobserved random cost, ,
diﬀerent for each choice. The instantaneous proﬁt, (), is discounted by discount
factor , 0    1. The observed state variables, s, include the age of the well,
A, the wellhead price of the hydrocarbon, P, the per-well remaining reserves,
Q, and the current operating state, o. The current operating state (o = active,
1; inactive, 2; or decommissioned, 3) is endogenous to the decision, and the
remaining reserves per well are endogenous (by extraction) and exogenous (upon
technology change or if another well is in the same pool).
The proﬁt (equation 1) if the producer chooses to produce is equal to the ex-
pected quantity of hydrocarbon recovered, Eq, times the price of the hydrocarbon,
less the royalty rate, R, a per unit lifting-cost to extract, C, and a ﬁxed cost M1.
The expected quantity recovered depends on the remaining per-well reserves, the
age of the well, and parameters, , to be estimated, Eq =
R Q
0 qfq(yjQ;A;)dy.
The per-unit lifting costs also depend on age, per well-reserves, and parameters,
, to be estimated, C = Cg(Q;A;).10 The royalty rate in Alberta adjusts ac-
cording to price and quantity produced, R = R(P;q). This proﬁt is then reduced
by the corporate income tax, , assumed ﬂat for all wells. If the current state of
10Chermak and Patrick [1995] and Foss et al. [2002] show how the lifting cost of natural
gas depends on quantity extracted and remaining reserves. Chermak and Patrick [1995] use
data from 29 gas wells in Wyoming and Texas from 1988 to 1990, and Foss et al. [2002] use
data from 22 gas wells in Alberta for roughly three years. They both ﬁnd that operating costs
increase with quantity extracted and decrease with remaining reserves. It is expected that
extraction costs rise as reserves are depleted; however, Livernois and Uhler [1987] explain that
the discovery of new reserves can increase the reserves by more than what is extracted, but
these new reserves are more costly to extract. This is how Livernois and Uhler [1987] explain
a positive relationship between extraction costs and reserves using aggregate data from the
Albertan oil industry. However, upon disaggregation, they ﬁnd the typical results of extraction
costs increasing with reserve depletion and quantity extracted.
16the well is inactive, there is a switching cost to activate, SC(2!1).
If the producer instead chooses that the well be inactive, the producer pays a
ﬁxed inactivity cost, M2, and if the current state of the well is active, a switching
cost SC(1!2).
To decommission a well is to enter an absorbing state for which the producer
pays a one-time switching cost, SC(1;2!3), assumed to be the same for active and
inactive wells.11 Leaving the well in its current state entails no switching costs,
SC(1!1) = 0, SC(2!2) = 0, and SC(3!3) = 0.
Each choice also consists of the unobserved component, , which can account
for unobserved heterogeneity in the ﬁrms or wells or more speciﬁc characteristics
that inﬂuence costs, such as, for example, pressure, condition of the well casing,
or whether hydrogen sulﬁde (a toxic gas) is present. I assume  enters the proﬁt




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
((1   R)P   C)Eq   M1
  maxf((1   R)P   C)Eq   M1;0g   SC(o!1) + 1 if d=1
 M2   SC(o!2) + 2 if d=2
 SC(o!3) + 3 if d=3
(1)
The expected present discounted value of the well can be expressed as the
unique solution to the Bellman equation12:














11It is not necessary to make decommissioning an absorbing state, but in the sample there
are only 261 observations of a switch from decommissioned to active, whereas there were 22,308
observed deactivations, 15,369 reactivations of inactive wells, 1,917 active wells decommissioned,
and 3,664 inactive wells decommissioned
12Following Blackwell’s theorem (outlined in Rust [1994], Theorem 2.3).
17The state transition probability density function, h(s0;0js;;d), is assumed
to be a Markov process. The Conditional Independence assumption, as per Rust







where () is the transition probability density function of . This means that,
for example, if a well starts to leak hydrogen sulﬁde (a highly poisonous gas),
there is the additional cost , which depends on the age of the well, but the age
of the well is not dependent on the presence of the leak. Speciﬁcally in the case


















Price is assumed to follow the exogenous process fP(P 0jP;&), characterized by
parameters &. Recoverable reserves decrease from extraction but also increase or
decrease from new discoveries, revisions, or technological change. The quantity
extracted, q, is modeled as a random draw from the density, fq(qjQ;A;).
This paper abstracts away from modeling the decision to decommission as a
function of the strategic interaction between agents competing for the same oil.
The common-pool problem would arise if more than one company competes for
a migratory hydrocarbon [Libecap and Wiggins, 1984, 1985]. However, each oil
and gas pool in the sample is a distinct reservoir that is conﬁned within imper-
meable rock or water and so only within pools would we expect to see behavior
inﬂuenced by the common-pool. For the majority of the pools in this paper only
18one ﬁrm has access to the pool and the number of wells in a pool is small (Table
1). The average number of wells in a gas pool is 3.5 (and 4.4 for oil pools), but
the majority of the time there is only 1 well per pool (the median and mode are
1 for both oil and gas). This may be driven by the fact that 81% of the mineral
rights in Alberta are owned by the Crown, and then leased to companies, whereas
in the U.S., mineral rights are mainly determined by surface landownership re-
sulting in more fragmentation of mineral rights.13 Nonetheless, observations of
wells that are in pools that have no other wells are modeled and estimated sep-
arately from wells that are in pools with other wells. Wells in single-well pools
and multi-well pools are modeled diﬀerently through their transition probability
of recoverable reserves from extraction, fq. For wells on single-well pools, only
when the decision is to extract, d = 1, is the transition probability of reserves
dependent on the probability of how much can be extracted, fq(Q Q
0
jQ;A;;d),
while for wells on multi-well pools, reserves transition according to this proba-
bility whether the operator extracts or not, fq(Q   Q
0
jQ;A;). Exogenous to
whether the well is active or not, recoverable reserves also follow another pro-
cess, fQ(Q
0
jQ;P;g), that accounts for the probability of change from improved
technology, discoveries, reassessment, and additions. The per-well reserves, Q,
also decrease whenever another well is drilled in the pool. It is assumed that
the number of new wells drilled is an exogenously determined random shock.14
The probability of a decrease in per-well reserves by another well being drilled
is incorporated into the exogenous change dictated by the transition probability
density fQ. The ﬁnal parameter estimates do not vary signiﬁcantly across wells
in single-well pools and multi-well pools (Appendix Table 11 and 12).
13In Alberta, most leases are for one quarter section (160 acres). Only one oil well can be
drilled on a quarter section, and only one gas well on one section (a company must obtain the
mineral leases for all four quarters of the section).
14For a model of where to drill for oil and gas, see Levitt [2009].
19Under the additional assumption that  is independent and identically dis-




where  are the parameters to be estimated for each well group (including the cost
parameters in the proﬁt equation and the parameters in the transition probability
density functions) and v is the ﬁxed point of v =  (v), where   is a contraction
mapping [Rust, 1988]:















with scale parameter, b, from the extreme value distribution of . Here, I nor-
malize b to 1 (equivalent to $1 million); if b approaches zero, V(s;) converges
to the ordinary Bellman equation.
The assumption of the extreme value distribution15 allows for a closed form










The estimation consists of three stages. First, I estimate the parameters of the
producer’s subjective belief for how the state variables progress over time as
a standard parametric estimation. Second, the parameter estimates from the
15Dagsvik [1995] showed that the generalized extreme value class is dense; choice probabilities
from any distribution can be approximated arbitrarily closely by choice probabilities from the
generalized extreme value class.
20ﬁrst stage are taken as given, and the remaining parameters in the Bellman
equation, the costs in the proﬁt function, are estimated via the Nested Fixed Point
Algorithm [Rust, 1987]. Nested within the algorithm to maximize the likelihood
function of the choice probabilities (equation 3), there is an inner algorithm to
compute the ﬁxed point, v, of equation 2. The outer loop of the algorithm,
the maximization of the likelihood, was submitted to the solver KNITRO [Byrd
et al., 2006]. The inner loop, which solves the ﬁxed point of equation 2, consists
of successive approximations followed by Newton-Kanotorovich iterations. The
third step is to obtain consistent standard errors from the full likelihood function.
The parameter values from the ﬁrst stage contain a measurement error, but they
are treated as the true parameters in the second stage, and so the standard errors
for the second stage parameters are inconsistent. To obtain consistent standard
errors, the consistent parameter values from the ﬁrst and second stages are used
as starting points for one Gauss-Newton step of the full likelihood function [Rust,
1994].
Well-level heterogeneity is accounted for by estimating the dynamic program-
ming model separately for diﬀerent well-types, g. All wells of the same type are
treated as homogeneous, and wells of the same type that also have the same re-
serve size and the same age are assumed identical. The well types are determined
by (1) whether the well is an oil or gas well, (2) whether the well is in a single-well
pool or a multi-well pool, (3) the royalty regime applicable, (4) PSAC area, and
within these groups, (5) clusters based on time invariant characteristics (depth,
initial pressure, density, water saturation, and temperature). The clustering only
occurs if the likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that clustering improves the ﬁt.16 This
results in 88 diﬀerent types of wells. The royalty regime depends on when the
16This is described in Appendix A.8.
21pool was discovered: there is an “old” category for oil from pools discovered before
1974, “new” for oil from pools discovered between 1974 and 1992, and “third tier”
for oil from pools discovered after 1992. For gas wells, “old” refers to gas from
pools discovered before 1974 and “new” to gas from pools discovered after 1974.
Within each type, the royalty depends on price and the quantity extracted. The
royalty regime remained the same from 1993 to 2009 [MineralAct], coinciding
with the study period.
5.1 First Stage Estimates
The ﬁrst stage involves estimating the producer’s beliefs about future prices and
recoverable reserves. These beliefs are unobservable and subjective, but here
I assume that the producer’s beliefs are recoverable from objective probability
measures estimated from the data. The parameters that maximize the ﬁrst stage











consisting of the parameters of the transition probability density of the price
process, #r and &r; the parameters of the probability density of the quantity
extracted, 0a, 1a, and a; and the parameters of the transition probability
density of remaining reserves 0 and 1.
To save computing time the age variable is discretized into the intervals A =
1;5;15;30 for 1  age < 5, 5  age < 15, 15  age < 30, age  30, under
the assumption that wells within these age intervals are similar. The transition
probability of entering the next interval is 1=nyears where nyears is the number of
years in the current interval.
225.1.1 Transition in Remaining Reserves from Extraction
Reserve changes due to extraction are such that when the well is active, the
quantity extracted is modeled as a random draw from a distribution that de-
pends on the per-well remaining reserves, Q. It implies that the producer only
chooses whether to extract and does not have control over the quantity extracted.
Although producers do have control over extraction rates, ultimately extraction
is also driven by geological constraints that the producer does not have control
over. In a regression of the quantity extracted, remaining reserves, porosity, oil
to water ratio, temperature, depth, density, and initial pressure are statistically
signiﬁcant in determining extraction, and are not controlled by a producer. The
equation that describes the production by well w in year t is:
logqwt = 0 + 1 logQwt + "wt (5)
assuming an independent and identically distributed N(0;1) error, ". The regres-
sion is estimated separately for each well type g and age group a.17 Extraction
from a well is truncated to fall in the interval [qL;qU] where the lower bound, qL,
is 10 8 (not zero because of the subsequent logarithm), and the upper bound, qU,
is equal to the well’s per-well remaining reserves, Q, multiplied by a factor, m,
which depends on whether the well is in a single-well pool m = 0 or a multi-well
pool m = 1. In the dataset there are a few observations where the amount pro-
duced in a year is greater than the per-well remaining reserves even for wells that
are on their own pools (6% of the production data would be classiﬁed as such).
Evidently the reserve size is sometimes an underestimate. Therefore, the factor
17Age groups depend on the age and the well-type group, g. If there are less than 30 obser-
vations of production within a given type’s age group, then observations from the age group
without clustering was used
23m is equal to the 99th percentile of the observed fractions qw=Qw (diﬀerent for
single-well pools and multi-well pools).18
5.1.2 Exogenous Transition in Reserves
I estimate a single probability density function to include any exogenous changes
in reserves, including changes from more wells being drilled, reassessments, and
new discoveries. Because I do not want to include changes in reserves due to
production in this probability, observations on estimates of per-well initial estab-
lished reserves (IER) are used.
Seventy-eight percent of the time the reserve data has no change in per-well




t = 1). When the price of oil or gas is
high, there is more exploration and more investment into enhanced recovery,
and therefore changes are also modeled to depend on price. When there is an




t ) can be approximated by an exponential dis-





t ) can be approximated by a diﬀerent exponential distribution.19






   follows
an exponential distribution with density function:
fQ (j) = exp( )
18The 99th percentile is used because there are a few outliers where qw dramatically exceeds
Qw. (That is, the 99th percentile of qw=Qw for gas wells on single-well pools, k0, is 2.9 compared
to a maximum of 66 and for gas wells on multi-well pools, k1, is 25.2 compared to a maximum
of 807.)
19The distribution of the natural logarithm of changes that occurred are illustrated in the
Appendix Figure 8.
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5.1.3 Transition in Price
Analysis of the price of oil is a well-researched area, although there is little con-
sensus for the best- ﬁtting model. Models diﬀer by allowing for mean reversion,
non-stationary unit roots, underlying market fundamentals, unexpected jumps,
or time-varying volatility, for example. Here, price is assumed to follow an exoge-
nous ﬁrst order Markov process. It is a reasonable assumption for the formation
of expectations for future prices, where the producer bases their expectation on
current prices. The Markov process includes a switching process between two
observed regimes: a high price regime and a low price regime, where the regimes
are determined depending on whether the price is above or below the average
price observed from 1971 to 2007. The transition probability of switching from
25regime H to L is simply the number of times that regime H was followed by
regime L divided by the number of times the process was in regime H.
^ pHL =
PT
t=1 Ifrt = L;rt 1 = Hg
PT
t=1 Ifrt 1 = Hg
While the opposite holds true for switching from L to H. For each regime, the
parameters from a regression with deviations from the mean logarithm of price,
}t;r = logPt   r, are estimated:
}t;r = #r}t 1;r + &r"t (6)
where " is independent and identically distributed N(0;1). The process is trun-
cated so that price does not fall below P = 1E   6 (and not zero because of the
subsequent logarithm). The transition probability of price in regime r is:
FP(PtjPt 1;r) =














where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and }
r =
ln(P)   r.
Because we know which regime we are in simply by knowing whether the price
is above or below the average price, there is no need to include “price regime” as
a state variable in the model. That is, the ﬁnal matrix of transition probability
weights for price depends only on the current price. The transition probability
matrix is derived from a mixture of the distributions under high and low price





pHHFP(PtjPt 1;r = H) + pHLFP(PtjPt 1;r = L) if P > P,
pLHFP(PtjPt 1;r = H) + pLLFP(PtjPt 1;r = L) if P  P.
.
5.2 Second Stage Estimation
For each diﬀerent well type, g, a diﬀerent set of structural parameters, 2nd = (C,
M1, M2, SC(1!2), SC(2!1)), is estimated. The likelihood of observing the deci-












t ;2nd; ^ 1st)
where p is the multinomial logit given in equation 3 for the probability that the
choice for well w at time t is decision d. For each iteration of the likelihood
there is a nested subroutine to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point to the Bellman equation 2.
The model is in discrete time and the producer chooses the operating mode on
a yearly basis. In reality, this decision is in continuous time; however, a well is
classiﬁed as an inactive well by the ERCB if it has not reported any volumetric
activity (production, injection, or disposal) within the last 12 months. Therefore,
the data are assigned as follows: for an oil well in 2000, the current operating
state, o, is the operating state in 1999, where the decision, d, is the operating
state in 2000, given the average wellhead price of oil (or gas for gas wells) in 2000,
the reserve size in 2000, and the age of the well in 2000.
The royalty rate is calculated using formulas speciﬁed by the Alberta De-
partment of Energy [Alberta Energy, 2006]. The rates range from 5% to 35%
27depending on the price of oil (or gas), when the reserve was discovered, and the
volume of oil (or gas) produced. As this model is based on the expected pro-
duction, and not the actual production, the royalty rate is the expected royalty
rate.20
The Alberta corporate income tax rate is 10% of taxable income while the
federal corporate income tax rate is 22.12%. The combined federal and provincial
tax rate on corporate income, , is set at 32.12% [Corporate, 2007].
Estimating the discount factor, , along with the cost parameters is diﬃcult.
For example, both a high reactivation cost and a low discount factor will prolong
reactivation. Therefore, I ﬁxed the discount factor at .80. Deciding upon .80
was through estimating the model at various ﬁxed discount factors. When the
discount factor is set low, the parameter values for the ﬁxed costs compensate by
being extremely low, and likewise when the discount factor is very high, the pa-
rameter values for the ﬁxed cost and reactivation costs in exchange are very high.
Discount factors in the range of .75 to .95 result in the most evenly distributed
parameter estimates (illustrated in Appendix A.5). Also, discount factors be-
tween .80 and .90 result in the highest value for the total log likelihood when
summed across the diﬀerent well groups. The discount factor of .80 corresponds
to an annualized discount rate of 22.31% ( = exp( r)). This is consistent with
Farzin [1985], who estimated a before-tax discount rate in the oil and gas industry
to be 25.4%, and the Texas Comptroller’s Property Tax Division, which uses a
range of discount rates from 17.29% to 22.52% for oil and gas properties [Texas
Comptroller, 2007].
The model was estimated under diﬀerent speciﬁcations for each of the costs.21
A parsimonious speciﬁcation that led to timely convergence and high likelihood
20Formulas can be found in Alberta Energy [2006]
21More on this choice can be found in the Appendix A.4.
28values is a speciﬁcation where the lifting cost depends on the reserve size and
age, C = 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A; the ﬁxed operating cost depends on age M1 =
4(1 + 5)A; the ﬁxed inactivity cost is a constant M2 = 6; deactivation cost
is a constant E1!2 = 7; and the reactivation cost depends on age SC2!1 =
8(1 + 9)A. By construction of the multinomial logit (equation 3), identifying
all ﬁxed costs of the model is not possible (for example, both  and a + b will
return the same decision rule). The location and scale of the proﬁt function is
unidentiﬁable, and therefore the proﬁt is normalized by a prespeciﬁed location
and scale. The location is normalized by ﬁxing the decommissioning cost to be
$75,000, SC(1;2!3) = :075. The scale is normalized by assuming that the error
term  has a type I extreme value distribution with standard deviation of $1
million (b = 1).
5.3 Third Stage Estimation: Maximizing the Full Likeli-
hood
The parameter estimates from the partial likelihood estimation are used as start-
ing values in the maximization of the full likelihood function. I allow for one
iteration of the maximization routine of the full likelihood function to determine
a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix for the estimates, which
is used to determine consistent standard errors. The average estimates and stan-
dard errors of the 88 diﬀerent well-types, weighted by the number of observations,
are displayed in Table 3 (averages are further broken down in the Appendix sec-
tion A.8). The coeﬃcients were derived using price data scaled by one million
dollars. The coeﬃcient on price in the probability distribution for an exogenous
increase in reserves, 1;U, appears to be very diﬀerent for oil and gas wells; how-
29ever, because the prices are in million dollars, inverted, and taken to the negative
power of e, the diﬀerence in the probability of an increase is not as large as these
coeﬃcients suggest. Nonetheless, gas reserve growth is more responsive to price
changes than oil reserve growth. The Nested Fixed Point Algorithm will not
identify all costs, but only relative costs. To identify the absolute costs external
information on actual well sale prices would be needed. The cost parameters are
interpreted in million dollars, but also in relation to a prespeciﬁed decommission-
ing cost of $75,000 (SC(1;2!3) = :075). If actual decommissioning costs are higher
than $75,000, then the proﬁt in the inactive and active states would be estimated
lower. The average annual ﬁxed cost of leaving the well inactive, M2, and the
cost of operating the well, M1 are on average negative, implying that the actual
decommissioning costs are on average more than $75,000. On average, the ﬁxed
costs of leaving an oil well inactive is less than the cost of having it active, and
for gas wells the opposite is true, but the lifting costs are more.
5.4 Goodness-of-Fit Tests
To test the dynamic programming model’s ability to ﬁt the data, the choice prob-
abilities from the estimated dynamic programming model p(djs; ^ ) are compared
to the observed (non-parametric) estimates of the conditional choice probability
function ^ p(djs). The nonparametric estimate ^ p is the sample histogram of choices
made in the subsample of wells with state s. Following Rust and Phelan [1997]
and Rothwell and Rust [1997], by sample enumeration, if S is a collection of s
30Table 3: Weighted Average Parameter Estimates from the Full Likelihood
Parameters Oil Gas
Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
Reserves Transition
0;1 0.311 (0.283) 3.377 (1.246)
0;5 0.275 (0.485) 2.371 (0.283)
0;15 0.082 (0.222) 2.171 (0.750)
0;30 -0.225 (0.254) 2.816 (0.822)
1;1 0.416 (0.079) 0.428 (0.141)
1;5 0.284 (0.148) 0.484 (0.032)
1;15 0.302 (0.070) 0.522 (0.081)
1;30 0.429 (0.108) 0.444 (0.244)
1 1.296 (0.022) 1.489 (0.050)
5 1.283 (0.032) 1.525 (0.083)
15 1.269 (0.023) 1.524 (0.099)
30 1.184 (0.100) 1.378 (1.254)
0;U 0.373 (0.035) 0.268 (0.025)
1;U 2.042e-7 (0.802) 573.599 (130.225)
0;D 0.691 (0.157) 0.436 (0.425)
1;D 5.151e-9 (0.006) 6.450e-5 (7.485e-5)
Price Transition
#L 0.438 (1.436) 0.708 (0.701)
&L 0.156 (0.774) 0.170 (0.297)
#H 0.620 (0.114) 0.596 (0.308)
&H 0.145 (0.051) 0.213 (0.056)
Lifting Cost (C)
1 0.010 (0.044) 0.073 (0.480)
2 0.012 (0.021) 1.010e-4 (3.317e-5)
3 0.156 (0.157) 0.082 (0.031)
Operating Cost (M1)
4 -0.988 (0.839) -1.639 (0.403)
5 -0.108 (0.032) -0.010 (0.099)
Inactivity Cost (M2)
6 -1.039 (0.017) -0.741 (0.098)
Deactivation Cost (SC(1!2))
7 3.737 (1.127) 1.730 (0.712)
Reactivation Cost (SC(2!1))
8 0.164 (3.954) 2.071 (1.489)
9 -0.555 (0.370) -0.030 (0.019)









Notes: These are the weighted averages of the estimates across 88 well groups. Using
speciﬁcation C = 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A; M1 = 4(1 + 5)A; M2 = 6; SC1!2 = 7
SC2!1 = 8(1 + 9)A. The standard errors are derived from the White [1982] misspeciﬁcation
consistent information matrix.










Ifdi = d;si 2 Sg
31where ^ F(dsjS) is the nonparametric estimate of the conditional probability dis-
tribution of s given S, equal to the number of observations in cell ds divided by
the total number of observations in all cells that comprise S. This is compared
to the estimates of the choice probability from the dynamic programming model:
p(djS; ^ ) =
Z
s2S










p(djs; ^ g)Ifsig 2 Sg
where p(djs; ^ g) is the probability given by equation 3 and ^ g are the estimates
of the structural parameters for group g.
Table 4 shows the observed choice probabilities alongside the expected choice
probabilities from the dynamic programming model for oil and gas wells. The
three panels in Table 4 show the cases that S is a collection of all possible s
cells, that S is a collection of wells that are active, and that S is a collection of
wells that are inactive. The dynamic programming model does a very good job
at predicting the overall observed choice probabilities. For the operating state
of gas wells, the chi-square test cannot reject the dynamic programming model
at the 70% signiﬁcance level. The chi-square test rejects the model for oil wells,
however it still does a very good job at predicting the choice probabilities (it is
not oﬀ by more than a percentage point).
The model is able to predict the very small probability of decommissioning a
well. For example, the observed proportion of active gas wells in the subsample
that are decommissioned is .0046, and the expected probability from the dynamic
programming model for that sample of wells to be decommissioned is .0043.
32Table 4: Actual versus Predicted Choice Probabilities
Oil Gas
Current State:
Active or Inactive Observed Expected Observed Expected
Pr(Active) 0.6207 0.6277 0.6878 0.6884
Pr(Inactivate) 0.3683 0.3621 0.3026 0.3021
Pr(Decommission) 0.0110 0.0102 0.0096 0.0094




Pr(Active) 0.9253 0.9310 0.9421 0.9428
Pr(Inactivate) 0.0691 0.0630 0.0534 0.0528
Pr(Decommission) 0.0056 0.0060 0.0046 0.0043




Pr(Activate) 0.0660 0.0750 0.1105 0.1108
Pr(Inactive) 0.9132 0.9071 0.8685 0.8682
Pr(Decommission) 0.0209 0.0179 0.0210 0.0210
No. Obs. 53198 56952
2 85.93 0.06
Marg.Sig. 0 0.97
Notes: The chi-square test statistic was calculated as
2 = N
P3
d=1 (ObsPr(d)   ExpPr(d))2=ExpPr(d), where N is the number of observations.
5.5 Comparing Actual and Simulated Data over Time
Using the state of the industry in 2000 as a starting point, I simulate the progres-
sion of wells, quantity extracted, and remaining reserves over seven years (Figure
2). The data are unbalanced for some wells because observations were missing for
some pools in some years. The simulations only include wells that are observed
in every year from 2000 to 2007. Each well’s path is simulated individually by
a series of pseudorandom draws from its type-speciﬁc probability density of the
state transitions and its subsequent type-speciﬁc probability density of operating-
state choice. Each well path is simulated 30 times to obtain a 90% conﬁdence
33interval around the average simulation. The dynamic programming model is able
to match the data closely for the ﬁrst year of the simulation for both oil and gas
wells, but over time slightly overpredicts the number of inactive oil wells.





























(a) Composition of Oil Wells
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(c) Production from Oil Wells
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(f) Reserves for Gas Wells
Figure 2: Comparison of Actual Data and Simulated Data 355.6 Counterfactual Simulations
5.6.1 Twelve Year Forecasts of Ideal Scenarios
Regulators allow producers to postpone decommissioning their wells in order to
facilitate reactivation of any wells should operating conditions become more fa-
vorable. But this allowance also provides a mechanism to avoid decommissioning.
A postponement in decommissioning stalls the reuse of the land and increases the
chance that contaminants enter drinking water, surface, or the atmosphere. The
model is used to simulate the industry under diﬀerent scenarios that operators
claim to be waiting for: high prices, improved recovery rates and reduced reac-
tivation costs. These ideal scenarios are compared to a baseline scenario where
prices, recovery factors and the state of the industry are simulated to progress
using only the estimated parameters, as described in the previous section.
In the ﬁrst scenario, as in the baseline scenario, each well-type faces the
costs estimated for the type, but they now receive a constant “high price” of
$197.72/bbl for oil and $462.44/e3m3 for gas produced.22 At the end of the 12
year forecast, averaged over 50 simulations, the high price for oil is 3.3 times the
average forecasted price of the baseline. As illustrated in Figure 3 this results in
21% more oil wells that are active under the high price scenario as compared to the
baseline prediction. The high price for gas wells is 2.1 times the average forecasted
price of the baseline in 2020, but only leads to 6.6% more wells that are active.
In the case of oil, the growth in reserves does not compensate for the increased
production, so that after 12 years there are fewer oil reserves than in the baseline
case. For gas reserves, the high price results in more reserve growth and shows
that the expected returns from investments in exploration or enhanced recovery
22This is equal to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook of
2009 “high price” case in 2030 for oil, and 1.5 times the “high price” for gas.
36are greater for gas than oil. By 2020 under the high price there are 133% more
reserves and 104% more production than in the baseline case. The gas wells that
are active result in producing more; however, the increased reserves and higher
prices are not suﬃcient to induce many inactive gas wells to be reactivated.
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(f) Reserves for Gas Wells
Figure 3: Forecast under Baseline and High Price Scenarios 38In a second scenario (not graphed) a hypothetical technology change allows
for all of the oil or gas in place to be recovered. Recovery rates range from 15%
to 95% with an average of 67% for gas and from .01% to 90% with an average of
12% for oil. In the case of gas, increasing the recovery rate to 100% increases the
production from producing wells but does not induce the reactivation of many
inactive gas wells (there are only 5.6% more active wells at the end of the period
than in the baseline case). In the case of oil, the increased recovery rate does
not change the number of active wells (there are only 1% more active wells).
Increasing the recoverable reserves is not enough to induce the reactivation of
inactive oil wells.
Table 5: Results at End of 12 Year Forecast
Ideal Scenarios Eﬀect on Activity
High recovery factors (100% recovery) 1-5% more active wells
High prices (2.1-3.3baseline price) 6-21% more active wells
Low reactivation costs (.25SC(2!1)g) 15-25% more active wells
However, technology might not only improve recovery factors, but the cost to
reactivate a well might decrease as well. Therefore, I simulate the industry when
the reactivation costs for all well groups are reduced by 25%. In the case of gas,
by 2020 this results in 14% more active wells, 12% more production, and 11%
less remaining reserves. In the case of oil, the simulation ends with 25% more
active wells, 27% more production, and 10% less reserves. Even though each year
more wells are deactivated than reactivated, reducing the reactivation costs by
25% is eﬀective in pushing the inactive wells out of the hysteresis in which they
reside. Unfortunately, I do not have data on reactivation costs over time and it
is diﬃcult to determine how likely a 25% reduction might be.
395.6.2 Twelve Year Forecast with Tax on Inactive Wells
The socially optimal solution would be to account for the externalities associated
with leaving a well inactive. This could be done by implementing a Pigouvian tax
on inactive wells equal to the marginal damages to the environment. Simulations
for a schedule of taxes on inactivity show that producers would prefer to pay
a high annual tax rather than to decommission wells (Figure 4). For example,
implementing a $3,000 tax each year on inactive wells increases the number of
active oil and gas wells by less than a percent as compared to the baseline case.
Increasing the inactivity tax shows that oil and gas wells respond diﬀerently. In
the case of gas wells, the inactive wells are more likely to be reactivated than
decommissioned. For example, with a $500,000 per year inactivity cost (or tax),
only 16% of the wells predicted to be inactive in the baseline case remain inactive–
most (80%) are reactivated. In the case of oil wells, a higher tax results in more
wells decommissioned than reactivated. For example, with a $500,000 inactivity
only 26% of the inactive wells remain inactive–most (70%) are decommissioned.





























(a) Composition of Oil Wells





























(b) Composition of Gas Wells


































(c) Production from Oil Wells
































(d) Production from Gas Wells


































(e) Reserves for Oil Wells
































(f) Reserves for Gas Wells
Figure 4: Eﬀect of Tax on Inactivity 416 Conclusion
The decision that oil and gas producers make for the operating state of their
wells can be categorized as a classic example of an irreversible investment under
uncertainty. Restarting production or ﬁnally decommissioning a well is an ex-
pensive endeavor and is made with uncertainty in future recovery technology and
prices. I show that this decision can be modeled by a real options formulation.
The operating decisions made for 84,000 wells in Alberta can be replicated by
modeling well operators as dynamic optimizers. Within-sample goodness of ﬁt
tests show that the model is able to closely predict actual operating choices.
The motivation of this paper was to determine the fate of inactive wells;
either they could be a blessing, if they are to be reactivated and contribute to
our energy supply, or they could be a curse, if they are never reactivated but must
undergo costly decommissioning. By having estimated the structural parameters
of a model of the optimal operating state, I can predict how the operating choices
might change under diﬀerent conditions. I ﬁnd that in order to see a substantial
reduction in the number of inactive wells, a dramatic improvement in extraction
technology and wellhead price would be needed. Increasing the proﬁtability of
active wells will not induce reactivation as much as reducing the reactivation
costs. However due to lack of data on reactivation costs, it is more diﬃcult
to assess the probability of a reduction in reactivation costs than to assess the
probability of an increase in prices or recovery rates.
If optimistic conditions are not enough to induce well reactivation, this implies
that wells are left inactive not because of the option to reactivate, but rather
the sunk cost of decommissioning is too high to warrant undertaking. Should
there be externalities from idling the wells (such as continued contamination
42of groundwater) that are not accounted for in the decision, then this behavior
may not be socially optimal. However, the model predicts that even a very
large increase to the cost of leaving a well inactive does not result in many wells
being decommissioned, implying that the cost of environmental damages from
idling wells would have to be very high in order to justify a policy that forces
decommissioning. Nonetheless, this paper demonstrates that for the majority of
inactive wells, temporary closure is, in eﬀect, permanent closure. This behavior
is likely generalizable to other industries that have high clean up costs and are
also allowed extended temporary closures.
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Table 6: Characteristics of PSAC Areas
PSAC
Area Surface Hydrocarbon Characteristics
1 Rocky Mountains Deep gas Strict environmental regulations
2 Ranching, farming and forest Oil and gas Easily accessed
3 Agricultural prairie grassland Gas and medium/heavy oil Easily accessed
4 Prairie and woodland Gas and heavy oil Easily accessed
5 Agricultural Oil and gas Most densely populated area
6 Prairie and woodland Shallow gas Only winter drilling
7 Agricultural and logging Oil and gas Often no road access and winter drilling
Figure 5: PSAC Areas
48A.2 Subsample as Compared to Full Sample
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Figure 6: Histogram of Age when Decommissioned
49A.3 Clustering Well Groups
Wells are categorized into groups depending on (1) whether the well is an oil or gas well,
(2) whether the well is in a single-well pool or a multi-well pool, (3) the royalty regime
applicable (which is based on when the pool was discovered), (4) PSAC area, and within
these groups, (5) two clusters based on time invariant characteristics. For gas wells these
are depth, initial pressure, and density and for oil wells, these are initial pressure, water
saturation, temperature, and depth. For some groups the model would perform better
if the groups were not broken down into two clusters. To determine whether to cluster,
the structural model was estimated both with and without clustering and a likelihood
ratio test was used. This was done for each well group; an example of PSAC Area 3
gas wells is presented in (Table 7). In this case, this group is divided into two clusters,
because clustering improves the likelihood such that the null hypothesis that the group
is homogenous and should not be clustered is rejected.
Table 7: To Cluster or Not to Cluster: Example Using PSAC Area 3 Gas Wells
Parameter Cluster Cluster Cluster Likelihood Marg.
1 2 1 & 2 Ratio Sig.
1 (C) 0.0816 (0.0305) 0.1590 (0.0772) 0.0559 (0.0194)
2 (C) 0.0002 (0.0001) 1.656e-7(9.259e-10) 8.358e-6(1.213e-5)
3 (C) 0.0035 (0.0139) 0.2686 (0.0015) 0.1042 (0.0514)
4 (M1) -1.9646 (0.0627) -1.6408 (0.2787) -1.4412 (0.0377)
5 (M1) -0.0086 (0.0019) -0.0004 (0.0064) -0.0100 (0.0025)
6 (M2) -0.6089 (0.0235) -0.6454 (0.0941) -1.2805 (0.0236)
7 (SC(1!2)) 1.5024 (0.0255) 1.8260 (0.8382) 6.0158 (0.0721)
8 (SC(2!1)) 3.1372 (0.0911) 3.2001 (0.9059) -8.2566 (0.1919)
9 (SC(2!1)) 0.0172 (0.0020) 0.0143 (0.0080) -0.6414 (0.0126)
No. Obs. 12944 703 13647
LL2 3110.9449 162.3341 3306.1562 65.7541 5.551e-16
Notes: These results are for determining whether wells in a multi-well “old” pool in PSAC
area 3 should be further broken down into clusters. Standard errors are in parentheses
(asymptotic standard errors from the partial likelihood). LL2 refers to the Log-Likelihood of
the 2nd stage. Parameters refer to cost speciﬁcation 7, in Table 8. The likelihood ratio test is
performed for all well groups.
A.4 Choosing the Cost Speciﬁcation
The model was estimated using a number of speciﬁcations in order to choose one cost
speciﬁcation. For example, Table 8 shows the diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the parameters,
and Table 9 shows the resulting Log-Likelihood values from the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcation 7, where the lifting cost depends on the reserve size and age, and the
operating cost and reactivation cost depends on age, was settled upon because it was a
parsimonious speciﬁcation that lead to timely convergence and high likelihood values.
50Table 8: Speciﬁcation of Cost Functions
Cost Lifting Costs Fixed Operating Fixed Idle Deactivation Reactivation
Spec (C) (M1) (M2) (SC1!2) (SC2!1)
1 1 2 3 4 5
2 1 + 2=Q
2
3 4 5 6
3 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A 4 5 6 7
4 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A + 4P 5 6 7 8
5 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A + 4P 5 6 7 8P
6 1=Q
1:5




+ 2(1 + 3)A 4(1 + 5)A 6 7 8(1 + 9)A
8 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A + 4P 5(1 + 6)A 7 8 9(1 + 10)A
9 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A 4(1 + 5)A 6(1 + 7)A 8 9(1 + 10)A
10 1 + 2=Q
1:5
3 + 4P 5 + 6P 7 + 8P 9 + 10P
11 1=Q
1:5
+ 2P 3(1 + 4)A 5 6(1 + 7)A 8(1 + 9)A
12 1=Q
1:5
+ 2P 3 4 5(1 + 6)A 7(1 + 8)A
13 1=Q
1:5
+ 2P 3 4 5 6
14 1=Q
1:5
+ 2(1 + 3)A + 4P 5(1 + 6)A 7(1 + 8)A 9 10(1 + 11)A
Notes: In all speciﬁcations the abandonment cost (SC1;2!3) is held ﬁxed (at $75,000).
Table 9: Speciﬁcation Search: Log-Likelihoods from PSAC Area 3 Gas Wells
Gas
Cost Spec Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Old New
1 -272.581 -3388.393 -3380.876 -4140.893
2 -272.581 -3388.392 -3336.074 -4145.124
3 -272.625 -3386.624y -3336.095 -4134.379
4 -272.776 -3584.931 -3358.012 -4165.348
5 -290.097 -3438.452 -3546.267 -4261.963
6 -282.194 -3411.877 -3435.400 -4220.655
7 -276.818 -3384.944 -3150.003* -3913.233*
8 -301.671y -3386.947 -3165.950 -3930.887
9 -280.258y -3411.778 -3221.193 -4027.607y
10 -709.548 -3363.691* -3343.370 -4576.699
11 -279.939 -3551.243 -3201.951y -3921.884y
12 -295.257y -3412.283y -3573.341y -4236.784y
13 -273.345y -3393.152y -3360.022 -4150.901y
14 -270.669* -3411.784 -3205.862 -4071.837
No. Obs. 961 12167 13647 14364
Notes: Old refers to wells drilled on pools discovered in 1974 or earlier, and new to wells on
pools discovered after 1973.  = :95 and b = 1. y indicates that the iteration limit was met.
The iteration limit was set at 1000 and although this is low, the speciﬁcations that converged
did so in 20 to 198 iterations.
51A.5 Choice of Discount Factor
There was no one discount factor that resulted in the highest likelihood for all groups.
Summing the Log Likelihoods across the well groups for estimations using diﬀerent
ﬁxed discount factors, a discount factor between .80 and .90 gave the highest likelihood
(results from gas wells are displayed in Figure 7, and the lifting cost for a well 5 years
old with per well reserves of 3 million m3). I choose a constant discount factor of .80
across all of the diﬀerent well types.
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of Using Diﬀerent Discount Factors on Results from All Gas
Wells
53A.6 Modeling the Probability of Transition of Recoverable
Reserves


































Figure 8: Histograms of the Natural Logarithm of Annual Change in Initial
Established Reserves (not including occurrences of no change)
54A.7 A Monte Carlo Experiment
A Monte Carlo experiment was used in order to test whether the computer code could
back out the structural parameters. This is an important test to determine whether the
program can indeed ﬁnd the parameters that it is designed to. I only test the ability
of the program to estimate the parameters in the second stage of the partial likelihood.
The parameters from the ﬁrst stage are set at estimates from a well group (speciﬁcally,
well group PSAC area 3 cluster 1 on a multi-well “new” pool). I choose a value for each
of the costs to be the “real” costs that I want to recover. Using the “real” parameters,
an artiﬁcial dataset is generated that contains price, remaining reserves, age, current
operating state, and what decision was made for the future operating state. To generate
a test dataset:
1. Three state variables (price, reserve size, age and current operating state) are
randomly drawn from a distribution similar to that of the real data.
2. The decision is created by:
 Solving the inner ﬁxed point for v(s;d), given the “real” parameters.
 Obtaining the probability of choosing an action (using on equation 3).
 Drawing a uniformly distributed pseudorandom number and depending on
where it falls in intervals dictated by the probabilities calculated from equa-
tion 3, assign a decision.
The above is repeated 10,000 to create a dataset of 10,000 observations. Then the
estimation is performed using only these data. Table 10 shows that the nested ﬁxed
point algorithm is able to back out the “real” parameters from the simulated dataset
closely.
Table 10: Estimates from the Monte Carlo Experiment
Variable “Real” Estimated Standard Starting Lower Upper
Parameter Parameter Error Value Bound Bound
1 (C) 0.012 0.0135 (0.0018) 0.001 0 1
2 (C) 1.2e-4 1.1641e-4 (5.3e-006) 1e-007 0 0.01
3 (C) 0.12 0.1209 (0.0044) 0.01 0 1
4 (M1) 0.12 0.1288 (0.0286) 0.01 -16 16
5 (M1) 0.12 0.1137 (0.0109) 0.01 -1 1
6 (M2) 0.12 0.1093 (0.0158) 0.01 -16 16
7 (SC(1!2)) 0.12 0.1120 (0.0395) 0.01 -16 16
8 (SC(2!1)) 1.2 1.0435 (0.0747) 0.01 -16 16
9 (SC(2!1)) 0.12 0.1539 (0.0189) 0.01 -1 1
Notes: Parameters refer to cost speciﬁcation 7. A sample size of 10,000. Stopping tolerance
for the Newton-Kantorovich iteration in the inner loop was set at 10 14.
55A.8 Parameter Estimates by Well Types
Table 11: Weighted Average of Full Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Diﬀerent
Types of Oil Wells
Oil
Parameter Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Third Old New Third
Reserves
0;1 -0.012(0.250) 0.679(0.250) 0.310(0.250) -0.881(0.250) -0.113(0.250) 0.798(0.250)
0;5 0.104(0.427) 0.187(0.427) 0.525(0.427) -0.232(0.427) -0.242(0.427) 0.549(0.427)
0;15 0.130(0.194) 0.280(0.194) -0.008(0.194) -0.307(0.194) -0.365(0.194) 0.649(0.194)
0;30 -0.039(0.223) -0.173(0.223) 0.017(0.223) -0.764(0.223) -0.613(0.223) -0.403(0.223)
1;1 0.481(0.070) 0.297(0.070) 0.489(0.070) 0.598(0.070) 0.490(0.070) 0.331(0.070)
1;5 0.314(0.130) 0.301(0.130) 0.244(0.130) 0.360(0.130) 0.427(0.130) 0.308(0.130)
1;15 0.320(0.061) 0.223(0.061) 0.359(0.061) 0.369(0.061) 0.385(0.061) 0.212(0.061)
1;30 0.420(0.094) 0.383(0.094) 0.395(0.094) 0.559(0.094) 0.496(0.094) 0.484(0.094)
1 1.304(0.020) 1.301(0.020) 1.267(0.020) 1.290(0.020) 1.362(0.020) 1.173(0.020)
5 1.345(0.028) 1.266(0.028) 1.277(0.028) 1.267(0.028) 1.121(0.028) 1.331(0.028)
15 1.303(0.021) 1.274(0.021) 1.273(0.021) 1.228(0.021) 1.230(0.021) 1.142(0.021)
30 1.201(0.090) 1.130(0.090) 1.177(0.090) 1.305(0.090) 1.278(0.090) 1.317(0.090)
0;U 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031)
1;U 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717)
0;D 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141)
1;D 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006)
Price
#L 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266)
&L 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702)
#H 0.620(0.101) 0.620(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101)
&H 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044)
Cost Param.
1 (C) 0.033(0.038) 0.000(0.038) 0.005(0.038) 0.028(0.038) 0.007(0.038) 0.010(0.038)
2 (C) 0.012(0.019) 0.004(0.019) 0.019(0.019) 0.003(0.019) 0.002(0.019) 0.012(0.019)
3 (C) 0.354(0.138) 0.077(0.138) 0.042(0.138) 0.644(0.138) 0.514(0.138) 0.037(0.138)
4 (M1) -1.771(0.735) -0.291(0.735) -1.078(0.735) -3.512(0.735) -2.411(0.735) -1.062(0.735)
5 (M1) -0.103(0.028) -0.128(0.028) -0.035(0.028) -0.194(0.028) -0.154(0.028) -0.052(0.028)
6 (M2) -1.073(0.015) -0.792(0.015) -1.147(0.015) -1.020(0.015) -1.430(0.015) -2.414(0.015)
7 (SC(1!2)) 4.011(0.991) 2.341(0.991) 4.417(0.991) 4.827(0.991) 1.330(0.991) 5.399(0.991)
8 (SC(2!1)) -5.734(3.818) 1.093(3.818) 3.445(3.818) -4.772(3.818) 3.088(3.818) -5.784(3.818)
9 (SC(2!1)) -0.459(0.337) -0.262(0.337) -0.761(0.337) -0.429(0.337) -0.289(0.337) -0.625(0.337)
Notes: Parameters of cost speciﬁcation 7. These are the weighted average of the estimates
across PSAC areas and clusters. “old” holds for pools discovered before 1974, “new” for pools
discovered between 1974 and 1992, and “third tier” for pools discovered after 1992. In
parenthesis are the weighted average of the standard errors calculated by the misspeciﬁcation
consistent version of the information matrix.
56Table 12: Weighted Average of Full Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Diﬀerent
Types of Gas Wells
Gas
Parameter Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Old New
Reserves
0;1 3.2222 (0.0735) 3.5797 (0.0778) 3.1326 (0.4116) 3.4648 (3.0257)
0;5 1.8686 (0.0383) 2.9016 (0.0481) 1.7393 (0.4192) 2.5924 (0.3488)
0;15 1.8459 (0.0819) 2.7575 (0.0556) 1.4052 (0.1241) 2.4687 (1.9315)
0;30 2.2226 (0.0611) 3.3901 (0.2310) 1.8580 (0.4209) 3.3240 (1.7113)
1;1 0.4133 (0.0084) 0.4177 (0.0086) 0.4324 (0.0462) 0.4326 (0.3425)
1;5 0.5073 (0.0053) 0.4375 (0.0076) 0.5274 (0.0491) 0.4772 (0.0358)
1;15 0.5436 (0.0105) 0.4636 (0.0066) 0.5926 (0.0155) 0.4979 (0.2058)
1;30 0.5082 (0.0077) 0.3758 (0.0308) 0.5512 (0.0545) 0.3914 (0.6050)
1 1.5116 (0.0016) 1.4743 (0.0028) 1.4987 (0.0132) 1.4902 (0.1260)
5 1.5083 (0.0015) 1.5171 (0.0047) 1.5073 (0.0100) 1.5481 (0.2195)
15 1.5777 (0.0022) 1.4787 (0.0084) 1.5750 (0.0121) 1.5077 (0.2587)
30 1.5270 (0.0010) 1.2959 (0.0437) 1.5017 (0.0086) 1.3139 (3.4687)
0;U 0.2291 (0.0049) 0.2904 (0.0076) 0.2291 (0.0245) 0.2904 (0.0397)
1;U 346.3773 (24.2742) 703.4817 (38.3561) 346.3773 (128.5903) 703.4817 (209.1606)
0;D 1.4e-5 (0.0630) 0.6860 (0.0309) 1.4e-5 (0.0552) 0.6838 (1.1583)
1;D 1.0e-5 (1.265e-5) 4.5e-5 (5.7e-6) 9.5e-5 (1.1e-5) 4.5e-5 (6.3e-6)
Price
#L 0.7076 (0.8605) 0.7076 (0.1456) 0.7076 (0.3925) 0.7076 (1.4235)
&L 0.1697 (0.6758) 0.1697 (0.0686) 0.1697 (0.0107) 0.1697 (0.7332)
#H 0.5958 (0.0291) 0.5956 (0.0669) 0.5959 (0.2178) 0.5958 (0.5995)
&H 0.2133 (0.0053) 0.2133 (0.0529) 0.2133 (0.0308) 0.2133 (0.0859)
Cost Parameters
1 (C) 0.2890 (0.5415) 0.1324 (0.1198) 0.0880 (0.1801) 0.0004 (1.0482)
2 (C) 7.2e-5 (3.7e-5) 1.6e-4 (2.1e-5) 2.0e-4 (3.0e-5) 9.3e-5 (1.1e-5)
3 (C) 0.1368 (0.0190) 0.0189 (0.0100) 0.0086 (0.0129) 0.2006 (0.0646)
4 (M1) -1.5761 (0.8891) -1.6003 (0.1449) -1.7024 (0.1828) -1.6118 (0.7917)
5 (M1) -0.0294 (0.1413) -0.0044 (0.0039) -0.0019 (0.0050) -0.0202 (0.2628)
6 (M2) -0.6956 (0.0782) -0.7463 (0.0443) -0.8102 (0.0188) -0.6710 (0.2165)
7 (SC(1!2)) 0.8997 (0.7921) 1.5201 (0.2393) 2.3127 (0.2868) 1.3755 (1.4883)
8 (SC(2!1)) 3.9745 (2.0169) 2.5734 (0.1688) 0.4862 (0.3893) 3.1112 (3.5563)
9 (SC(2!1)) -0.0005 (0.0150) 0.0156 (0.0014) -0.1282 (0.0026) 0.0279 (0.0482)
Notes: Parameters of cost speciﬁcation 7. These are the weighted average of the estimates
across PSAC areas and clusters. “old” refers to pools discovered before 1974 and “new” to
pools discovered after 1974. In parenthesis are the weighted average standard errors.
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